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INTRODUCTION

Adulthood is a social construct. For that matter, so is childhood.
But like all social constructs, they have real consequences. They
determine who is legally responsible for their actions and who is
†
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not, what roles people are allowed to assume in society, how
people view each other, and how they view themselves. But
even in the realms where it should be easiest to define the difference—law, physical development—adulthood defies simplicity.1
When does a juvenile legally become an adult? This is literally a lifeor-death question because the United States Supreme Court held that the
Constitution prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on a juvenile.2
Despite the enormous consequences, the Supreme Court has spent
little time defining what it means to be a juvenile.3 Instead, the Court has
simply accepted the relatively recently adopted conventional wisdom that a
person is considered an adult on his or her eighteenth birthday.4
But there is no rational or scientific basis for drawing the line between
being an adult and being a juvenile at age eighteen. Indeed, recent scientific research—the same brain research the United States Supreme Court
has used to adopt legal principles that both protect and harm adolescents—
proves that brain maturation actually occurs from ages ten to twenty5
seven.
This article will explore whether the line between a juvenile and an
adult should remain at eighteen. It begins by exploring the history of dis6
tinguishing childhood from adulthood. Next, this article details the legal
7
system’s differing treatment of certain ages. Then, it details the criminal
justice system’s treatment of persons below the age of eighteen. 8 Next, this
article discusses the science behind cognitive development.9 Then, it discusses Supreme Court decisions that affect rights of individuals based on
age.10 Finally, the article concludes that drawing the line of adulthood at

1. Julie Beck, When Are You Really an Adult?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/when-are-you-really-an-adult/422487/
[https://perma.cc/32YT-CY52].
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3. See id. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18 . . . however, a line must be drawn.”).
4. See id. (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”).
5. See Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part VI.
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age eighteen without consideration of an individual’s characteristics is arbitrary under the Constitution.11
II. HISTORY OF ADULTHOOD: SHIFTING BETWEEN MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL CAPACITY
Historically, society has fluctuated in how it determines when a child
becomes an adult. The concepts of who is classified as a child and what
emotional, physical, and intellectual properties a child is assumed to pos12
sess have adjusted in response to societal changes.
In early Roman law, society set the age of adulthood when a person
obtained “intellectual capacit[y] required to exercise full citizenship, manage their affairs, and become parents and the heads of families themselves
[at] age fifteen for males.”13 But the Romans did not assume a person’s
physical capacity meant they had full intellectual maturity.
Roman law placed free males who were technically “of full years
and rights” [at puberty] under the temporary guardianship of
adults known as Curatores. A Curator’s approval was required
to validate young males’ formal acts or contracts until they
reached twenty-five years of age. Indeed, Roman law used the
terms “minority” and “majority” in reference, not to age fifteen,
14
but instead to age twenty-five—the age of . . . full maturity.
So, while the Romans acknowledged physical capacity for some
rights, legal rights constituting full autonomy were restrained until an individual was considered intellectually mature.
On the other hand, developing Western societies emphasized one’s
ability to perform in the military to determine their age of majority.15 In
Medieval Europe, there were only adults and infants,16 and the primary
characterization between adults and infants was their physical dependence

11.
12.

See infra Part VII.

Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1093 (1991).
13. Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 63
(2016). During this era, the onset of puberty signaled the “physical capacity” to become
parents. Id.
14. Id. (footnotes omitted).
15. See T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 23 (1960).
16. PHILIPPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY
LIFE 128 (Robert Baldick trans., 1962) (“In medieval society the idea of childhood did not
exist . . . . The . . . awareness of the particular nature of childhood . . . which distinguishes
the child from the adult . . . was lacking.”).
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17

on others to survive. Once a child was physically independent, they were
considered full-functioning members of society with legal rights.18
At this time and place, a person’s physical independence directly cor19
related to their ability to participate in warfare. While no specific age was
set by law, attaining the physical capacity to participate in warfare was generally around age fifteen.20
But later, the needs of the military changed; suits of armor became
heavier and weapons became more lethal.21 As a result, younger males
were no longer physically capable of handling weapons required for war.
The change in the nature of military required more physical development,
so “[t]he age of eligibility for knighthood (the equivalent of the age of majority at the time) increased to twenty-one.”22
Over time, English law makers developed a structure that assigned
criminal and civil liabilities—including the ability to work, inherit family es23
tates, and commit a crime—on societal age lines. Deriving the difference
between juveniles and adults from the age of knighthood, England determined the age of adulthood to be twenty-one.24 There was no considera25
tion of mental capabilities tied to adult rights.

17. Id. at 329 (explaining physical dependence typically ended around age seven).
18. Id. “Children”—at least those over the age of seven in mid-16th century England—
were treated the same as adults because society lacked the idea that children were different
or had different needs. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 1 (2005). People over the age of seven were of “ripe age” to marry and could drink in taverns, eight-year-olds could be hanged,
and teenagers were routinely elected to Parliament. Id.
19. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 63 (“When the nature of warfare changed during
the Middle Ages so did the age of majority.”).
20. See James, supra note 15, at 22 (“Gothic kings seem frequently to have come of
age at fifteen.”). In France, childhood ended at seventeen when youth were “then judged
strong enough and sufficiently qualified for the culture of their lands, the mechanic arts and
commerce in which they were all employed.” Id. See also Hamilton, supra note 13, at 63
(“The age of majority between the ninth and eleventh centuries was fifteen for males.”).
21. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 63.
22. Id. at 63–64.
23. The movement towards determining the mental capabilities of adolescents came
from the Enlightenment Period where John Locke and philosophers began using reason
and scientific developments to show children were different from adults in their inherent
vulnerability and lower mental capacity. See Ainsworth, supra note 12, at 1093–94.
24. James, supra note 15, at 33. Historically, European countries used physical capacity to set the age of adulthood, i.e., when a person was physically independent of their parents, they were considered full-functioning members of society. See ARIÈS, supra note 16,
at 329. When a man could participate in warfare, he was considered an adult. Id. For England, the military armor was heavy and advanced insofar that the age of military participa-
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The United States adopted the age of twenty-one as the age of adulthood during the American Revolution.26 But the age of adulthood in the
United States has also fluctuated, changing over the years and varying
among states. When the age of twenty-one for adulthood was implemented, the governments did not question whether a person was physically or
mentally capable of adult activities27—it was simply the societal norm.28
Twenty-one remained the age of adulthood until well into the twentieth century.29 Then, in 1942, similar to England’s rationale, the changing
needs of the military dictated a change in the age of adulthood. During
World War II the military needed more bodies; as a result, Congress lowered the draft age to eighteen.30 In doing so, Congress did not consider if
eighteen-year-olds were mature enough to participate31—they simply needed more bodies.32
Lowering the draft age to eighteen created a notable difference between being eligible for the draft and other adult responsibilities, including
tion was raised to twenty-one. Id. See generally Tamar Schapiro, What Is a Child?, 109
ETHICS 715 (1999) (discussing age-line creation and the nature of adult-child distinction).
25. See ARIÈS, supra note 16, at 128, 329.
26. See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 980 (rev. 2d ed. 2005)
(detailing the traditional British common law age of majority at twenty-one in most American states until the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment); see also Ex parte Petterson,
166 F. 536, 546 (D. Minn. 1908) (“By the common law the age of majority is fixed at 21 for
both sexes, and, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, every person under that age,
whether male or female, is an infant . . . .”).
27. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 559 (2000) (“The designation of a categorical legal age of majority can be understood as reflecting a crude judgment about maturity and competence.”).
28. See id.
29. See Baril v. Baril, 354 A.2d 392, 396 (Me. 1976) (“At common law the age at
which a person’s status changed from that of an infant or minor to that of an adult in the
case of both sexes was twenty-one years, regardless of physique, mentality, education, experience or accomplishments.”); Thomas v. Couch, 156 S.E. 206, 206 (Ga. 1930) (“One becomes of full age on first moment of day preceding twenty-first anniversary of birth . . . .”);
Fitzhugh v. Dennington, 2 Lord Raymond 1094, 1096, 92 E.R. 225, 226 (KB 1704) (noting
that “twenty-one years . . . is of age”).
30. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76–783, 54 Stat. 885
(1940) (establishing a national draft) (also known as Burke-Wadsworth Act); see Franklin
D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the Bill Reducing the Draft Age (Nov. 13, 1942), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (John Wooley & Gerhard Peters eds.),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210187 [https://perma.cc/4B7R-MYNN].
31. See Universal Military Training: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed
Servs., 80th Cong. 2 (1948) (statement by George C. Marshall, U.S. Sec. of Def.) (“[W]e
[the United States] must find some method of maintaining a sufficient military posture, one
sufficiently strong without the terrific expense of a large standing Military Establishment.”).
32. See id.
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the right to vote. Eighteen-year-olds could be drafted and killed in a war,
but they could not vote for their president who was sending them to war.33
This discrepancy created a furor, so Congress moved to lower the age of
34
adulthood across the board. Soon, the age of eighteen began to replace
the age of twenty-one across a range of contexts and has since been adopted as the age of adulthood.35
Throughout these age-classification transitions, no one inquired as to
whether people were mentally mature enough to vote, serve in the military, or receive other adult rights—society simply deemed the treatment to
36
be unfair given their military participation.
While the age of eighteen is a general guideline for being an adult
and is used by the majority of states, each state has a different definition of
what classifies a person as an adult—especially in the criminal context.37 Sixteen states use fourteen as the cutoff age for trying youths as adults, while
38
six states set the bar at thirteen. Kansas and Vermont allow ten-year-olds

33. See Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and
Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 290, 296 (2006).
34. The 26th Amendment and the Progressive Constitution, CONST.
ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (March 24, 2011), https://www.theusconstitution.org/blog/the-26thamendment-and-the-progressive-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/VPE5-8PS3]. President
Dwight Eisenhower became the first president to publicly voice support for amending the
minimum voting age. “For years our citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 have, in time of
peril, been summoned to fight for America. They should participate in the political process
that produces this fateful summons.” Id.
35. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 65; Termination of Support- Age of Majority, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (May 6, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/termination-of-child-support-age-of-majority.aspx [https://perma.cc/UMD5-3NQA]
(listing statutory citations for the ages of majority of each U.S. state and territory).
36. See Michael Philip Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People:
An Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 653 (1988).
37. See Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Jan. 11, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JF5J-SGUR] (showing varying ages of certifying children to adult court
from 15 to 18); Thirteen States Have No Minimum Age for Adult Prosecution of Children, EQUAL JUST. INSTITUTE (Sept. 16, 2016)¸ https://eji.org/news/13-states-lackminimum-age-for-trying-kids-as-adults [https://perma.cc/E8CR-N8NB]; see e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 609.055, subdiv. 2 (2018) (“Children under the age of 14 years are incapable of
committing crime.”).
38. Mary Wood, Standards Needed for Juvenile Confessions, Panelists Say, UNIV.
VA. SCH. L. (Feb. 16, 2005), http://content.law.virginia.edu/news/2005_spr/ps_juvenile.htm
[https://perma.cc/U6CV-PHFS].
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to be tried as adults, and twenty-three other states have no age cutoff, also
allowing ten-year-olds to be tried as adults.40 When classifying an event as
“adult,” the physical act itself can dictate an age of adulthood;41 other times
42
it is the youth’s mental ability.
The history of differentiating between adults and juveniles reveals that
there has been a lack of consistency in making this crucial determination,
and no rational basis for making the distinction.
III. ADULTHOOD AND CRIMINALITY
The difference between an adult and a juvenile is perhaps most pronounced in the criminal justice system. For a variety of reasons, juveniles
are given special protection—such as freedom from capital punishment—as
well as denied certain rights, like the right to a jury trial.43
Generally, when a person turns eighteen, criminal justice systems
consider that person to be an adult, and they are no longer afforded the
same protective rights as a juvenile.44 This means that an eighteen-year-old
is subject to adult court, including possibly being subjected to the death
45
penalty. Despite the enormous consequences, there is no rational or scientific basis for distinguishing between a person who has just turned eighteen and person who is about to turn eighteen; in fact, there could not be a

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See MINN. STAT. § 624.7181, subdiv. 2 (2018) (“A person under the age of 21
who carries a semiautomatic military-style assault weapon . . . on or about the person in a
public place is guilty of a felony.”); MINN. STAT. § 240.25, subdiv. 8 (2018) (“A person under the age of 18 may not place a bet . . . or participate in card playing at a card club at a
licensed racetrack.”); MINN. STAT. § 97B.021, subdiv. 1 (2018) (noting that children under
sixteen years of age may possess a firearm if accompanied by a parent, and that if they are
fourteen or fifteen, they must also have obtained a firearms safety certificate).
42. See, e.g., Michael A. Corriero & Alison M. Hamanjian, Advancing Juvenile Justice Reform in New York A Proposed Model, N.Y. St. B.J. 20, 22 (2008) (“In Roper, the
Supreme Court recognized the developmental differences of minors under 18 as an accepted societal factor in determining the appropriate treatment of juvenile offenders,
thereby officially acknowledging the conclusions of behavioral scientists as to the diminished capacity and culpability of adolescents.”).
43. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that a juvenile
is not guaranteed the right to a jury trial under the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments).
44. See
Juvenile
vs
Adult
Justice,
PBS
FRONTLINE,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/juvenile/stats/juvvsadult.html
[https://perma.cc/3WSH-5UXP].
45. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty is
unconstitutional for persons under the age of eighteen at the time of their capital offense).
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rational or scientific basis because the difference between the two could
literally be a matter of seconds.

A. Age-Based Criminal Culpability
William Blackstone,46 an English lawmaker, wrote one of the earliest
records for defining the age line in criminality. Blackstone identified young
children as incapable of committing a crime due to their mental capacity47
and established two age lines: seven and fourteen.48 Children under the age
of seven were considered too young to completely understand their actions;49 thus, they could not form the “vicious will” necessary to commit a
crime and could not be charged.50 Children aged seven through fourteen
“were presumed to lack any criminal capacity, but this presumption could
be rebutted.”51 No one over the age of fourteen could raise infancy or im52
maturity as a defense. Blackstone’s classification was based on his generalized view of the mental capacity of varying age groups in their ability to
understand their wrongdoing.53

46. William Blackstone was one of the most important English lawyers during the
time of the American Revolution. See Sir William Blackstone, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Feb.
10,
2019),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Blackstone
[https://perma.cc/2NYQ-QMY9].
47. See AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 5
(2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authch
eckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FVN-J9RL] (citation omitted) (“Two things were required
to hold someone accountable for a crime. First, the person had to have a ‘vicious will’ (that
is, the intent to commit a crime). Second, the person had to commit an unlawful act. If either the will or the act was lacking, no crime was committed.”).
48. Children under the age of seven were considered too young to completely understand their actions and could not form the “vicious will” necessary to commit a crime. See
AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 47, at 1. Children aged seven through
fourteen were presumed incapable of crime, but this presumption could be rebutted. See
id. No one over the age of fourteen could raise infancy or immaturity as a defense. See id.;
DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE COURT THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12 (2001).
49. See Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (“At common law, children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent.”).
50. See AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 47, at 1.
51. MYERS, supra note 48, at 12.
52. Id.
53. AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 47, at 5 (quoting Blackstone)
(“But by the law, as it now stands . . . the capacity of doing ill, or of contracting guilt, is not
so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent’s understanding
and judgment.”).
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Blackstone’s age lines are present in the criminal system today—
especially as they relate to mental culpability. The modern criminal justice
system considers one’s mental state in a variety of crimes, such as first54
degree murder. Criminal culpability assumes that a person must, or
should, know the wrongfulness of the act or be able to form the specific
mens rea required to commit a crime.55 Although ages vary, every state has
an exception that, depending on the circumstances, limits the criminal responsibility of youth.56
The most significant changes to age-based criminality occurred in the
twentieth century. The first juvenile court was established in Cook County,
Illinois, in 1899.57 Here, a progressive reform movement sought to change
the way the legal system treated youths.58 Theoretically, the juvenile court
was designed to identify underlying causes of behavior and provide necessary treatment to prevent future serious misbehavior.59 The driving motive
behind the juvenile court was to intervene in a minor’s life when they were
60
still amenable to change and to “save [them] from a downward career.”
However, from the 1980s to the early 1990s, there was an increase in
crimes committed by young people, and youth crime arrest rates increased

54. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added) (stating that whoever
“causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death
of the person” is guilty of murder in the first degree).
55. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 503, 509 (1984).
56. See Corriero, supra note 42, at 21; Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than
It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 11 (2002). But see Marcy Mistrett & Jeree Thomas, A
Campaign Approach to Challenging the Prosecution of Youth as Adults, 62 S.D.L. Rev.
559,
560
(2017);
State Snapshot, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE,
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/state-work/state-snapshot [https://perma.cc/T34KFPS2].
57. See GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUVENILE COURT? 2 (Virginia Nordin ed.
1968) (referencing Act of April 21, 1899, Ill. Laws, § 21, p. 137 (1899)); see also SAMUEL
M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 2006); Laurence
Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
47, 49 (2009). But see COLO. LAWS ch. 136 § 4 (1899) (explaining that statute that came
two months prior to Illinois protecting children between the ages of eight and fourteen).
58. Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323–
75 (1991).
59. MYERS, supra note 48, at 14.
60. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967); see also Douglas R. Rendleman,
Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV 205, 212 (1973).
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61

by seventy-five percent. During this period, there was also an increase in
homicides committed by people under the age of eighteen.62 As a result,
the state began punitively charging young individuals.63 During this time,
64
more minors were being tried as adults in adult court. Historically, courts
had the discretion to transfer the minor to adult court following an assessment of the crime and the individual’s culpability.65 Unfortunately, today
many minors are automatically transferred to adult court based on their
age and criminal act without an assessment.66 In fact, each year, over
200,000 juveniles under eighteen are prosecuted in adult courts.67 Many of
these cases are transferred without any assessment of individual mental
culpability.68

B.

Minnesota: The Importance of Age in Determining and Addressing
Criminality

Today, an adult in Minnesota is defined as a person eighteen years of
age or older,69 while a minor is any individual under the age of eighteen.70
A child under the age of fourteen is considered incapable of committing a
61. JAMES C. HOWELL, JUV. JUST. & YOUTH VIOLENCE 75 (1997) (referencing
SNYDER & TAMAGATA, NAT’L CTR FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
1996 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 14 (1996)).
62. Id.
63. See MYERS, supra note 48, at 19 (“In contrast to the conventional juvenile court’s
emphasis on ‘child saving’ and serving the ‘best interests of children’ . . . reforms reflect[ed]
a perceived need to ‘get tough’ with violent adolescents.”).
64. CAROL J. DEFRANCES & KEVIN J. STROM, JUVENILES PROSECUTED IN STATE
CRIMINAL COURTS 4 (1997).
65. MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: A PROPOSAL FOR A
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 14 (2006).
66. Some states provide for “once an adult, always an adult” transfer, which are laws
that require prior juvenile adult transfers to always be prosecuted as an adult regardless of
whether the offense is serious or not. Teigen, supra note 37.
67. CORRIERO, supra note 65, at 128 (referencing Laurence Steinberg, Should Juve-

nile Offenders Be Tried as Adults? A Developmental Prospective on Changing Legal Policies
(Jan.
19,
2000),
http://willamette.edu/cla/additional-academicopportunities/debate/pdf/youth_forum/kpdc%20research/motion%202%20affirm/bongo_DATA%20
ON%20JUVENILES.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F5F-WM42]).
68. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 487–88 (2012) (“Of the 29 relevant
jurisdictions, about half place at least some juvenile homicide offenders in adult court automatically, with no apparent opportunity to seek transfer to juvenile court. Moreover, several States at times lodge this decision exclusively in the hands of prosecutors, again with no
statutory mechanism for judicial reevaluation.”).
69. MINN. STAT. § 645.451, subdiv. 3 (2018).
70. § 645.451, subdiv. 2.
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“crime” due to their mental capacity and consequently cannot be tried in
adult court.71 While the age of adulthood has not changed, the laws governing criminal punishments for different ages have.
Minnesota established a separate court for juveniles under the age of
seventeen in 1905.72 The juvenile court was created to have jurisdiction
over individuals under the age of eighteen, but it does not possess jurisdic73
tion over those sixteen or older in certain situations. The court can also
“certify” an individual over the age of fourteen to be tried as an adult.74
Prior to the 1990s, certification of a juvenile to adult court was “often difficult to obtain even for very violent offenses, and w[as] based in large part
upon the testimony of psychologists and psychiatrists.”75 The heightened
crime rates of the 1980s and 1990s, however, prompted a change in the
certification process.76 When the certification process changed, juveniles
were no longer considered inherently less culpable.77 Instead they were
considered a threat to public safety. So, the burden of proof shifted to the
71. § 609.055, subdiv. 1.
72. See generally An Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent,
Neglected and Delinquent Children, ch. 285, sec. 3, 1905 Minn. Laws 419,
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/1905/0/General+Laws/Chapter/285/pdf/
[https://perma.cc/A8XH-Z99Q] (codified at MINN. STAT. § 7164 (1913)). The act
stemmed from Cook County, Illinois, which founded the first juvenile court in 1899. See
Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—A
Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 889 (2006) (providing a comprehensive review of the creation of the juvenile court).
73. MINN. STAT. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6 (2018); §§ 260B.101, 225.
74. Juvenile Delinquency, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/HelpTopics/Juvenile-Delinquency.aspx https://perma.cc/DB3D-TWLM]; see, e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 1 (2018) (providing that children aged fourteen and older who
are charged with a felony-level offense can be certified by the juvenile court and transferred
to adult court); MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (2018).
75. JAMES C. BACKSTROM, EXTENDED JUVENILE JURISDICTION “ONE MORE STRIKE
AND YOU’RE OUT!” MINNESOTA’S BLENDED SENTENCING LAW 2 (1998),
https://www.co.dakota.mn.us/Government/Attorney/WorkExperience/Documents/Extend
edJuvenileJurisdictionBlendedSentencingLaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NKS-AKT2].
76. See generally Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of
Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 143–200 (2014). Between 1984 and
1998 the number of juvenile petitions increased by 325 percent from 15,000 to more than
63,000. See Dana Swayze & Danette Buskovick, Back to the Future: Thirty Years of Minnesota Juvenile Justice Policy and Procedure, 1980–2010, MINN. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY
OFF.
OF
JUST.
PROGRAMS
2
(2014),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2014/other/140424.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7RS-4K7V].
77. MINN. STAT. § 260B.001, subdiv. 2 (2018) (“The purpose of the laws relating to
children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce
juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain
behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior.).
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juvenile to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that they were suitable
for treatment in the juvenile system instead of adult court.78 Once a child is
moved to adult court, juvenile court jurisdiction ends.79
The certification process and the consideration of multiple offenses
does not always consider whether an individual had the mental capacity to
warrant adult jurisdiction. Instead, the state and legislature demand the
courts look at an individual’s age to determine what punishment is warranted. For example, a sixteen-year-old may use tear gas,80 but only eighteen-year-olds can use a stun gun81—a violation of either rule is a misde82
83
meanor. Furthermore, persons under age sixteen can hunt but may not
possess a firearm—unless they meet an exception, such possession will result in a misdemeanor.84 These laws are just some examples of the inconsistent age laws present in Minnesota’s system.
IV. SCIENCE BEHIND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: CULPABILITY AND
CAPABILITIES
Society recognizes the difference in mental capacity by limiting certain rights—such as requiring heightened ages to consume alcohol or rent a
car—to persons over the age of eighteen.85 Despite eighteen being deemed
78. BACKSTROM, supra note 75, at 4.
79. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2018) (“When a child is alleged to have committed,
after becoming 14 years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult,
the juvenile court may enter an order certifying the proceeding for action under the laws
and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations.”); see Minn. R. of Juv. Delinq.
Pro. R. 18.01 subdiv. 2 (“The district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in criminal proceedings concerning a child alleged to have committed murder in the first degree
after becoming sixteen (16) years of age. Upon the filing of a complaint or indictment
charging a sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) year old child in adult court proceedings with the
offense of first-degree murder, juvenile court jurisdiction terminates for all proceedings
arising out of the same behavioral incident.”).
80. § 624.731.
81. Id.
82. § 624.731 subdiv. 8.
83. MINN. STAT. § 97A.451 (2018).
84. § 97B.021.
85. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984) (mandating
that states who allow persons under 21 years of age to purchase and possess alcohol will
have their federal highway apportionment fee reduced by ten percent); Under 25 Car
Rental,
HERTZ,
https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/misc/index.jsp?targetPage=Hertz_Renting_to_Drivers_Un
der_25.jsp [https://perma.cc/J4WP-9VSZ] (“While Hertz happily rents to customers 20
and above, there is an added surcharge under some circumstances for renters between 20
and 24 years old.”).
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the age of adulthood by lawmakers, the brain is not fully formed until the
mid-twenties. In fact, most reasoning and decision-making parts of the
brain continue developing until the mid-twenties.

A. Psychological and Scientific Research Show Brains Are Not Fully
Developed Until Age Twenty-Seven
During much of the 1900s, many believed that the human brain was
almost completely formed and unchanging after childhood.86 However,
scientific discoveries show evidence of “neuroplasticity,” which challenges
this assumption.87 Adolescence is roughly defined as the period between
the onset of puberty and adulthood maturity, which may last from age ten
to age twenty-five.88 Research performed by numerous scientists89 shows
that the areas of the brain responsible for impulse control and executive
90
functioning undergo drastic changes throughout this stage.

B.

Risk-taking and the Relationship to Cognitive Development

Adolescent risk-taking is controlled by two systems: the socioemotional and cognitive control systems.91 The socioemotional system is re86. Daniel Weitz, The Brains Behind Mediation: Reflections on Neuroscience, Conflict Resolution and Decision-Making, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 471 (2011) (referencing NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF 248, i (2007)).
87. Id. at xix.
88. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, EMERGING CONCEPTS BRIEF: WHAT ARE THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE? 1 (2006),
http://www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/resource_134.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NP2-E9FD].
89. See Tracy Rightmer, Arrested Development: Juveniles’ Immature Brains Make
Them Less Culpable Than Adults, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 1 (2005) (referencing Jay
N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 77 (2004); Beatriz Luna & John A. Sweeney, The Emergence of Collaborative Brain Function: fMRI Studies of the Development of Response Inhibition, 1021
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 296 (2004); Elizabeth Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain

Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001); Lawrence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence What Changes and Why?, 1021 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51 (2004)).
90. Rightmer, supra note 89, at 4.
91. Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision Making: Reduced Culpability in the Criminal Justice System and Recognition of Capability in Other Legal Contexts , 14 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 375, 377 (2011) (referencing Praveen Kambam & Christopher Thompson, The Development of Decision-Making Capacities in Children and Adolescents: Psychological and Neurological Perspective and Their Implications for Juvenile Defendants ,
27 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 173, 176 (2009); Laurence Steinberg, Age Differences in Sensation
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sponsible for processing emotions and balancing of rewards versus punishment.92 The cognitive control system, located in the prefrontal cortex,
controls higher executive functions such as impulse control, future orienta93
tion, and deliberation. The socioemotional and cognitive control systems
work together when an adolescent decides to act.94 The interplay between
the two systems can affect an adolescent's decision to commit a crime,
their ability to participate in criminal proceedings, and even their response
to interrogation tactics.95
The socioemotional system—the reward-seeking function—is highly
96
active in adolescents. Puberty causes a restructuring of dopamine levels
within the brain where dopaminergic activity in the prefrontal cortex increases significantly.97 Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that transmits signals between nerve cells when learning about rewards, essentially making a
person feel good.98 For adolescents, the increase of dopamine occurs before the control systems in the prefrontal cortex mature.99 So, the adolescent brain, full of dopaminergic reward-seeking activity, is particularly sensitive to seeking this feel-good dopamine.100 According to research on
adolescent risk-taking, “[b]ecause dopamine plays a critical role in the
brain’s reward circuitry, the increase, reduction, and redistribution of dopamine receptor concentration during puberty, especially in projections
from the limbic system to the prefrontal area, is likely to increase reward
101
seeking behavior and accordingly, sensation seeking.” One way adoles102
cents seek dopamine release is through peer approval and acceptance.

Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764 (2008)).
92. Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent
Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (2007).
96. Kambam & Thompson, The Development of Decision-Making Capacities in
Children and Adolescents: Psychological and Neurological Perspective and Their Implications for Juvenile Defendants, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 173, 176 (2009).
97. Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54.
98. See Richard D. Palmiter, Is Dopamine a Physiologically Relevant Mediator of
Feeding Behavior?, 30 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 375, 375–381 (2007).
99. See B.J. Casey, Sarah Getz & Adriana Galvan, The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEV.
REV. 62, 70 (2008).
100. Schad, supra note 91, at 378.
101. Id. (citing Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54).
102. See Leah H. Somerville, The Teenage Brain: Sensitivity to Social Evaluation, 22
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 121, 121 (2011).
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The cognitive control system, which controls impulses and considers
future implications, does not fully form until the mid-to-late twenties.103
The prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for more future-thinking control, controlling impulses, and planning ahead—the hallmarks of adult behavior—is one of the last to mature.104 Underdeveloped aspects of cognitive
control, combined with reward-seeking behavior from dopamine levels,
105
tend to result in risky behavior. Furthermore, adolescent youths’ lack of
experience makes them less aware of risks,106 such as criminal responsibility.
107
By adulthood, cognitive capacity for impulse control fully develops.
This self-regulation and life experience makes an adult better equipped to
resist impulses.108 Research in the social and neurological sciences shows
that, although young people develop at different rates, overall, adolescents
tend to be less mature than adults.109 This “research confirms a guiding
principle—the distinction between youth and adults is not simply one of
age, but one of motivation, impulse control, judgment, culpability and
physiological maturation.”110 Many states recognize that adolescence is a
time for youth to learn through trial and error because the “laws reflect societal understanding that adolescents do not have the ability to fully understand adult responsibilities or appreciate potentially grave, long-term con111
sequences.”
As will be discussed later, since the 1960s, Supreme Court rulings
have accepted findings in adolescent brain science through banning the
use of capital punishment for juveniles,112 limiting life without parole sen103.
104.

See Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54.

NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE TEEN BRAIN: STILL UNDER
CONSTRUCTION 3 (NIH Pub. No. 11–4929 2011).
105. See Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGICAL BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 217–18 (2009).
106. Schad, supra note 91, at 378.
107. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent RiskTaking, 28 DEV. REV. 78, 99 (2008).
108. Id.; see also CORRIERO, supra note 65, at 29 (“Self-control . . . is the habit of behavior which can be developed over a period of time, a habit dependent on the experience
of successfully exercising it. This particular type of maturity, like so many others, takes
practice.”) (quoting Professor Frank Zimring).
109. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137,
157–71 (1997) (citing ROBERT SIEGLER, CHILDREN’S THINKING 49-57 (2d ed. 1991)).
110. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 88, at 2.
111. Id. at 1. For additional examples see Part II (discussing ages for purchasing tobacco, gambling, drinking, and consent).
112. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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113

tences to homicide offenders, banning the use of mandatory life without
parole,114 and retroactively applying115 the unconstitutionality of life without
parole decision for offenders under the age of eighteen.116
V. STATE V. NELSON: THE BRIGHT LINE RULE IN ACTION

A. Facts
In 1995, Jonas Nelson was born into an unhappy family.117 Jonas’s father, Richard Nelson, was abusive and controlling.118 Jonas’s mother left his
father in 2010 because she feared for the safety of herself and her children.119 In August 2013, after patterns of misbehavior, Ms. Singer sent Jonas to live with his father.120 Some time had passed, and Jonas reached out
to his mother, complaining that “his father was not allowing him to work,
drive, or do anything and that he felt secluded and alone. He told his
friends that his father was being ‘very strict and unfair’ and not to be fooled
121
by his father’s nice-guy act.”
On December 30, 2013, Jonas turned eighteen.122 One week later, on
January 6, 2014, Jonas phoned 911 and reported his father had been
123
murdered. Mr. Nelson was found dead on the living room floor from a
gunshot wound to the head.124 Jonas’s original description of the night was
that “he was upstairs watching a movie when he heard what sounded like
125
glass breaking and a ‘pop.’” Jonas then went downstairs and found his
father’s body and called 911.126 However, after a series of interrogations
lasting from 11:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., Jonas proceeded to tell the investigators that he had walked downstairs from his bedroom to get a glass of wa113. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
114. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
115. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 1546 (2016).
116. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF: JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 1
(2016),
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-Life-WithoutParole.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TTG-V2NV].
117. See Brief and Addendum for Appellant, State v. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d 505
(Minn. 2016) (No. A15-1821), 2016 WL 4212309, at *6.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *7.
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. Id.
123. Brief and Addendum for Appellant, supra note 117, at *7.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *8.
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ter, picked up a .300 Remington Ultra Magnum bolt-action rifle and ammunition from the gun cabinet in the den, and shot his father in the head
as he slept on the living room floor.127 “He said he knew from television
shows there would be ‘penalties’ - 'they say criminals get eight years in
prison’ - but ‘I'm not worried.’”128

B.

Procedure and Holding

Following a jury trial, Jonas Nelson was found guilty of several offens129
es, including first-degree premediated murder, second-degree intentional
130
murder, and second-degree unintentional felony murder.131 The district
court sentenced Nelson to life in prison without the possibility of release
pursuant to Minnesota statutes section 609.106, subdivision 2(1), for firstdegree premeditated murder.132 At the time of the sentencing, District
Court Judge Terrence Conkel said, “[I] took no joy or satisfaction [in issuing the sentence]. . . . I have never before sentenced a person as young as
you to prison for so long.”133
Nelson argued to the Minnesota Supreme Court that even though he
was one week past his eighteenth birthday when he committed the offense,
he was psychologically and socially still a juvenile.134 As a result, he argued
that the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of release was unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama.135 The Minnesota Supreme
Court did not reach this claim because it had not been raised in the district
court.136 Importantly, the court did not preclude Nelson from making this
argument in post-conviction proceedings.137

127. Id. at *13.
128. Id.
129. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1).
130. § 609.19, subdiv. 1(1).
131. § 609.19, subdiv. 2(1).
132. State v. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d 505, 506, 508 (Minn. 2016).
133. Suzanne Rook, Nelson Found Guilty of Murder, Sentence to Life Without Parole,
LE
CENTER
LEADER
(Aug.
10,
2015),
http://www.southernminn.com/le_center_leader/news/article_2228b340-55b2-57ae-94249a205b815466.html [https://perma.cc/8NSZ-PMG5].
134. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d at 511.
135. Id. at 512 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012)).
136. Id.
137. Id. Nelson recently filed a post-conviction petition challenging his sentence.
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Jonas—The Non-Juvenile Offender

Jonas was eighteen and one week when he committed homicide. Jonas underwent a psychological evaluation by Dr. Harlan Gilbertson, who
administered an array of intelligence and psychiatric tests and determined
that “Jonas, because his father had not let him make decisions, was ‘quite
socially delayed’ and ‘probably 13 or 14 from a psychological standpoint.’”138 Dr. Gilbertson also found Jonas suffered from a dysthymic disorder and PTSD; he was going through life following and doing, not questioning or arguing because he did not make decisions.139 So, while Jonas’s
physical age was eighteen-and-one-week, his psychological age was closer
to fourteen, an age that would allow for juvenile proceedings and ultimately make the mandatory life without parole sentence unconstitutional.140
VI. ANALYSIS: THE CATEGORICAL CHALLENGE FOR NON-JUVENILE
OFFENDERS
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
141
punishments.’” In Miller, the Supreme Court did not address whether
mandatory life without parole is necessarily constitutional as applied to
those over the age of eighteen. However, because the constitutional principles are premised on developmental maturity and capacity for rehabilitation, not chronological age, Miller’s constitutional principles should apply
equally to a defendant who, like Jonas Nelson, was just seven days past his
eighteenth birthday at the time of his offense.
The Supreme Court recognized that cognitive abilities impact an individual’s ability to assess committing a serious offense that could be worthy of an adult sentence.142 The Supreme Court also recognized that adolescents are unfinished products, developmentally and morally, and that
these factors hold constitutional significance.143 Consequently, the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not

138. Brief and Addendum for Appellant, State v. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d 505 (Minn.
2016). (No. A15-1821), 2016 WL 4212309, at *15.
139. Id.
140. See Brief and Addendum for Appellant, supra note 117, at *30–31 (citing Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012)).
141. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
142. Id. at 472; see supra Part V.
143. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472; see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 146 (2014).
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limit the prohibition against life without the possibility of parole to those
under the age of eighteen; rather, the Eighth Amendment requires that
multiple factors should be taken into account to determine an individual’s
psychological age, such as maturity, intelligence, experience, and ability to
comprehend before a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of
parole can be imposed.144
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”145 This means that “the State
must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.”146
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that “punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”147 This proportionality principle requires the
court to evaluate “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.”148
Over the last several decades, the Court has issued a series of decisions that stand for the proposition that, under the Eighth Amendment,
juvenile defendants are categorically less culpable than others and, therefore, constitutionally different for purposes of sentencing, specifically the
death penalty.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court considered whether it was
constitutional to execute a fifteen-year-old person.149 The Court concluded
that it was not constitutional because, based on scientific findings, adoles144. State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). These categories reflect
qualities necessary to determine if a confession is voluntary. See id. This writer believes that
if a court could find a confession is voluntary based on these qualities, the court would also
determine the person had a mature mental state.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
146. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
147. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)).
148. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)).
149. 487 U.S. 815, 821–23 (1988) (“In performing that task the Court has reviewed
the work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries, and has carefully considered
the reasons why a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of
cases. Thus, in confronting the question whether the youth of the defendant—more specifically, the fact that he was less than 16 years old at the time of his offense—is a sufficient reason for denying the State the power to sentence him to death, we first review relevant legislative enactments, then refer to jury determinations, and finally explain why these indicators
of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that such a young person is
not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty.”).
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cents have less capacity to control their conduct and think in long-range
terms.150 Moreover, adolescents differ from adults because they have not
achieved independence from parental control. The Court also noted that
crimes committed by a young person represent a failure of family, school,
and the social system.151 While a young person should not be absolved of
responsibility for his actions, his transgressions are not as morally repre152
hensible as that of an adult. In Thompson, the Supreme Court concluded for the first time that a class of punishment was categorically disproportionate and in derogation of society’s evolving standards of decency when
153
imposed upon a youthful offender.
In Roper v. Simmons,154 the Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile defendants. There, the Court recognized
that a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill155
considered actions and decisions.” Additionally, the Court discussed that
youths still struggle to define their identity; thus, even a heinous crime
committed by a youth is less supportable than one by an adult, due to a
156
lack of depraved character in the youth. The Court reasoned that given
the lessened culpability, youths should not be subject to the same offenses
as adults:
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to
the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor
as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law's most
severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of
youth and immaturity.157

150. Id. at 834 (noting that Justice Powel in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115,
n.11 (1982), quoted the 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders; thus the Court endorsed the view that adolescence is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence
and psychological damage).
151. Id. at 834.
152. Id. at 838.
153. Id. at 821–38 (holding that categorically, capital punishment, per the Eighth
Amendment, “prohibits the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the
time of his or her offense”).
154. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
155. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
156. Id. at 570.
157. Id. at 571.

Colbert and Kroeger: Convicting Juveniles to Life Without Parole

2019]

LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE

1121

The Court also noted that youth and immaturity undermine another
goal of criminal sentencing: deterrence. The Court recognized that the
likelihood of a teenager weighing the consequences or possibility of execu158
tion is nonexistent. Moreover, the Court weighed that it is difficult even
for expert psychologists to differentiate between a juvenile offender’s culpability and transient immaturity.159 Thus, due to their mental state, juve160
niles cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.
The Supreme Court extended this reasoning to sentences other than
death in Graham v. Florida,161 where the Court declared life in prison
without parole was unconstitutional for juvenile defendants who had not
committed homicide. In Graham, the Court relied on psychology and
brain science, noting that parts of the brain involved in behavior control
continue to mature through late adolescence.162 The Court concluded that
brain development is relevant to the status of the offender and should be
considered next to the nature of the offense to which a harsh penalty may
163
apply. “It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile
offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral
culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear
164
on the analysis.”
In Miller, the Supreme Court drew upon its decisions in Thompson,
Roper, and Graham to establish a substantive constitutional rule banning
165
life without parole for all but the rarest of juveniles. An offender’s age is
relevant in determining the appropriate punishment insofar that developments in brain science continue to show fundamental differences in juvenile and adult minds.166 As a result, criminal procedure laws that fail to take
a defendant’s youthfulness into account are fundamentally flawed.167

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
162. Id.; see Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 16–24, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621),
2009 WL 2247127; Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 087621), 2009 WL 2236778.
163. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69.
164. Id. at 69.
165. 567 U.S. 460, 476–79 (2012) (stating that capital defendants have the opportunity
to demonstrate mitigating circumstances surrounding the act so that “the death penalty is
reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses”).
166. Id. at 471–72.
167. Id. at 472–73.
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[Children] “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and
outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they
have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack
the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing
settings. And because a child's character is not as “well formed”
as an adult's, his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely
to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”168
At the heart of this constitutional evolution is an increasingly settled
and sophisticated body of research documenting the distinct emotional,
psychological, and neurological attributes of youth. Through a series of
decisions, the Supreme Court has held that, because adolescents are developmentally distinct from adults, sentencing courts must consider juveniles’ “lessened culpability,” “greater ‘capacity for change,’” and individual
169
characteristics before imposing the harshest available sentences.
Before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, a court must “take
into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,” the Miller
170
Court explained. The Court went on to specify five “Miller factors” that
a sentencing court must consider before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, including: (1) the juvenile's “chronological age” and related
“immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences;”(2) the juvenile’s “family and home environment that surrounds him;”
(3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may
have affected him;” (4) the “incompetencies associated with youth” in dealing with law enforcement and a criminal justice system designed for adults;
and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation.”171 Prior to imposing a juvenile life
without parole sentence, the sentencing judge must consider how these
factors impact the juvenile’s overall culpability.172
“Miller’s central intuition” was “that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change,” the Court stated four years later in
Montgomery v. Louisiana.173 Miller established a “substantive” rule of
criminal law which did not merely proscribe mandatory life without parole
for juveniles but created a presumption that only those “rare” juveniles

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
Id. at 465 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74 (2010))
Id. at 480.
Id. at 477–78.
Id.
136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
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whose offenses reflect “permanent incorrigibility” can be sentenced to
terms that deprive them of a meaningful opportunity for release.174
The Court explained that the constitutional flaws in mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles are the denial of prospects for
release; the “preclu[sion] [of] consideration of his chronological age and
its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences”; the “prevent[ion] [of] taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him,” and the
“neglect[] [of] the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.”175 Not least, “this mandatory punishment
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances
most suggest it.”176
Though these constitutional decisions involved defendants who were
under eighteen at the time of their offenses, the Supreme Court did not
address what to do with those individuals who are just over eighteen; that
is, just over the line established twelve years ago in Roper—as adopted by
Miller—but to whom all of the various Eighth Amendment concerns about
protecting juveniles from disproportionate punishment apply with equal
force. As the Court noted in Roper:
[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the
objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities
that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual turn 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.177
The Supreme Court has refused to draw bright lines in a closely related area of the law—the application of the death penalty against those
with intellectual disability. In Hall v. Florida, the Court considered whether the state could determine whether an individual is intellectually disabled
based solely on an I.Q. point threshold.178 Under Florida’s statute, if a defendant was found to have an I.Q. score above 70, “sentencing courts
[could not] consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual
disability” such as “medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and
reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances.”179
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 743.
Miller, 576 U.S. at 477.
Id. at 478.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
572 U.S. 701, 707 (2014).
Id. at 712.
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Comparing the approaches of various states to determining intellectual disability disqualification for the death penalty and relying on the diagnostic practices of the American Psychiatric Association, the Court ruled
that “the law requires that [the defendant] have the opportunity to present
evidence of his intellectual disability,” as opposed to subjecting him to a
mandatory scheme based on a single factor.180
Miller’s ban on mandatory life without parole sentences is based not
on chronological line drawing, but on the Court’s conclusion that the neurological differences between youth and adults undermine the justifications
for subjecting those whose brains are still developing to the harshest sentences. Notably, research now shows that these neurological and behavioral characteristics are also present in eighteen-year-olds, and federal and
state courts have relied on this research to invalidate sentencing schemes
that require courts to sentence eighteen-year-olds to life in prison without
181
possibility of parole.
The Court’s declaration that youth “are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing” rests not on bright line age distinctions, but on the Court’s recognition that, because of their immaturity,
young people, as a group, are less culpable for offenses committed and
more capable of rehabilitation.182 In Roper, the Court for the first time relied on a burgeoning body of scientific literature to support “[what] any
183
parent knows”—that children are different than adults. The “relevance of
youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities
of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”184 “For most
teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with maturity
as individual identity becomes settled.”185 By the time the Court rendered
its opinions in Graham and Miller, scientific evidence had assumed a
more central role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis.186
180. Id. at 724.
181. See e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460 (2012); State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d
93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
182. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
183. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
184. Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Ad-

olescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003)).
185. Id. (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra note 184, at 1009).
186. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (“Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on
what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well.”); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”).
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Because of the fundamental developmental differences, the Supreme
Court has concluded that juveniles are inherently less culpable than adults,
and, thus, the penological justifications for the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole apply to juveniles with less
force.187 Retribution is less justifiable because the actions of a juvenile are
less morally reprehensible than those of an adult due to a juvenile’s dimin188
ished culpability. Similarly, deterrence is less effective because juveniles’
“impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions” make them “less
likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making deci189
sions.” Incapacitation is not applicable because juveniles’ personality
traits are less fixed and therefore it is difficult for experts to “differentiate
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”190 Finally, rehabilitation cannot be the basis for life imprisonment without parole because that “penalty forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal” by “denying the defendant the right to reenter the
community.”191
These same characteristics relied upon by the Supreme Court to limit
the punishment on juveniles apply equally to people over the age of eighteen with scholars explaining that “[o]ver the past decade, developmental
psychologists and neuroscientists have found that biological and psychological development continues into the early twenties, well beyond the age
192
of majority.” Scientists now know that, within the human brain, the areas
responsible for movement and sensory perception develop first, followed
by cognitive and executive skills, which develop throughout adolescence.193
Among the last to develop are the areas of the brain required for weighing
risks, making reasoned decisions, and controlling impulses, which develop
throughout the late teens and twenties.194

187.
570–71.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73; Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–74; Roper, 543 U.S. at
Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 72–73 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).
Id. at 74.

Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie, & Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood
as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 641, 642 (2016).
193. Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174 (2004).
194. Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 193 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S.
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It is now well established that “young adulthood is a developmental
period when cognitive capacity is still vulnerable to the emotional influences that affect adolescent behavior, in part due to continued develop195
ment of prefrontal circuitry involved in self-control.” Neuroscientific
studies show that the brains of eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds remain
immature in three core areas that support self-control and emotional regu196
lation: the amygdala, the prefrontal cortex, and the ventral striatum.
These findings are supported by fMRI studies, which show that the volume of cortical gray matter in areas critical to integrating higher thought
processing does not peak until the mid-twenties, and which results in a
lack of structural development necessary for higher level reasoning and
emotional regulation.197 These studies have led numerous scientists and
scholars to agree that “young adult offenders aged 18–24 are more similar
to juveniles than to adults with respect to their offending, maturation, and
198
life circumstances.”
Increasingly, courts are relying on these contemporary neuroscientific
findings about the brain development of young adults to forbid sentencing
schemes that mandate life in prison without possibility of parole for eighteen-year-old defendants. In Cruz v. United States, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Connecticut concluded that “‘the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility
of parole’ for offenders who were 18 years old at the time of their
199
crimes.” The Supreme Court held that the district court was not foreclosed from imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole,
but the sentence is required “to take into account how adolescents, including late adolescents, ‘are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’”200

Tanenhaus eds., 2014); see also Steinberg, Social Neuroscience Perspective, supra note
107.
195. Alexandra Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications
for Law and Policy, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 769, 771 (2016).
196. See, e.g., B.J. Casey, Beyond Simple Models of Self-Control to Circuit-Based Accounts of Adolescent Behavior, 66 ANNUAL REV. OF PSYCHOL. 295, 300 (2015).
197. See Gogtay, supra note 193, at 8174–79.
198. Rolf Loeber, David P. Farrington, & David Petechuk, Bulletin 1: From Juvenile

Delinquency to Young Adult Offending (Study Group on the Transitions Between Juvenile
Delinquency and Adult Crime), NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 20 (2013),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242931.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CVT-3C2C].
199. No. 11-CV-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (quoting
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012)).
200. Id. (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 480).
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In reaching its conclusion, the Cruz Court considered whether the
scientific evidence justified distinguishing between those under eighteen
and those who are eighteen.201 The Cruz Court first looked at the available
scientific and sociological research that the United States Supreme Court
considered in Roper, Graham, and Miller to identify differences between
juveniles under the age of eighteen and fully mature adults—differences
that the Supreme Court concluded undermined the penological justifications for the sentences in question.202 Cruz continued:
The Supreme Court in these cases identified “[t]hree general
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults”: (1) that juveniles have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,” often resulting in “impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions;” (2) that juveniles are “more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;” and (3) that “the character of a juvenile is not
as well formed as that of an adult.” Because of these differences,
the Supreme Court concluded that juveniles are less culpable
for their crimes than adults and therefore the penological justifications for the death penalty and life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole apply with less force to them than to
adults.”203
The Cruz Court then considered those same characteristics and the
expert testimony, articles, and studies provided by Temple University psychology professor Dr. Laurence Steinberg, in which Dr. Steinberg stated
that that he was “‘[a]bsolutely certain’ that the scientific findings that underpin his conclusions about those under the age of 18 also apply to 18year-olds.”204
Similarly, in State v. O’Dell,205 the Washington Supreme Court held
that age is a mitigating factor in sentencing, even when the defendant is

201. Id. at *18–24 (citations omitted). The court also concluded that, where there are
“some important societal lines remain at age 18, the changes discussed above reflect an
emerging trend toward recognizing that 18-year-olds should be treated different from fully
mature adults.” Id. at *22.
202. Id. at *22.
203. Id. at *22 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)).
204. Id. at *23 (citing Alexandra Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an
Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 769 (2016); Laurence Steinberg et al., Around the World, Adolescence is a Time of Heightened Sensation Seeking
and Immature Self-Regulation, 12532 DEV. SCI. 1, 1–13 (2017) (citation corrected)) (Doc.
No. 115-1).
205. 358 P.3d 359, 366 (2015).
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206

over the age of eighteen. Citing to Roper, the Washington court found
that a sentence that may be proportional for an adult can be disproportionate as applied to a someone who committed an offense shortly after
207
turning eighteen years old. Considering the implications of research findings on adolescent brain development, the court stated:
In light of what we know today about adolescents' cognitive and
emotional development, we conclude that youth may, in fact, relate to [a defendant's] crime, that it is far more likely to diminish
a defendant's culpability than this court implied in Ha'mim; and
that youth can, therefore, amount to a substantial and compelling factor, in particular cases, justifying a sentence below the
standard range . . . For these reasons, a trial court must be allowed to consider youth as a mitigating factor when imposing a
sentence on an offender like O'Dell, who committed his offense
just a few days after he turned 18.208
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized, based on com209
mon sense, science, social science, and “[what] any parent knows” —that
juveniles are different. Because juveniles are different, the Court has prohibited them from being put to death and has strictly limited the use of life
without the possibility of parole.
That same common sense, science, social science, and “[what] any
parent knows,”210 leads inexorably to the conclusion that it is impossible to
define “juvenile” as simply someone under the age of eighteen years old.
“Juvenile” must be defined by the characteristics of the person, not simply
their chronological age.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).

Id.
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